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ALIENS--DENIAL OF CITIZENSHIP TO ALIENS WHO SOUGHT EXEmPTIO FROm
MILrrAY SERVICE DURING WAR.-A group of applicants for naturalization con-
sisted of persons who, during the late war, fell into two classes, declarant and
nondeclarant nonenemy aliens, and declarant and nondeclarant enemy aliens.
The government objected, since each applicant as a registrant under the Conscrip-
tion Law, Act of May IS, 1917 (4o Stat. at L. 76), sought exemption on, the ground
of alienage, i. e., answered the questionnaire respecting such exemption in the
affirmative. Held, that the objection be overruled. lit re Natui-alization of Aliens
(1924, E. D. Wis.) i Fed. (2d) 594.
Applications of declarant nonenemy aliens who sought draft exemption on
grounds of alienage have generally been denied. It re Loen (1919, W. D.
Wash.) 262 Fed. 166 (with prejudice) ; In re Pitto (1923, D. Or.) 293 Fed. 200
(without prejudice); In. re Trachsel (ig2i, S. D. Ohio) 271 Fed. 779; see
Hauge v. United States (1921, C. C. A. 9th) 276 Fed. III, 112; contra: In re
Watkiss (192o, S. D. Tex.) 26g Fed. 466. And likewise when exemptions were
sought on grounds other than alienake. In re D- (1923, N. D. Ohio)
29o Fed. 863 (conscientious objector) ; cf. In re Norman (1919, D. Mont.) 256
Fed. 543 (deferred classification by reason of engagement in vital occupation) ;
In re Roeper (1921, D. Del.) 274 Fed. 49o (scruples against shedding blood in
warfare) ; In re Rubin (1921, E. D. Mich.) 272 Fed. 697 (alienage and physical
unfitness); see (1923) 22 M ic . L. REv. 152; contra: In re Sien (1922. D.
Mont.) 284 Fed. 868 (alienage, dependency, physical unfitness). A similar
diversity of views is found in the cases of nondeclarant nonenemy. In re
Levy (1922, W. D. Tex.) 278 Fed. 621 (granted); In re Shanin (1922, D.
Mass.) 278 Fed. 739 (denied); see (923) 36 HAIv. L. REV. 337; (1922) I TEx.
L. REV. III. And also in those of enemy aliens. In re Cuny (192o, S. D. Tex.)
269 Fed. 464 (declarant, denied without prejudice) ; In re Linder (1923, S. D.
Calif.) 292 Fed. 1001 (nondeclarant, denied without prejudice); In re Miegel
(1921, E. D. Mich.) 272 Fed. 688 (declarant, granted); In re Silberschuta
(I92o, E. D. Mo.) 269 Fed. 398 (declarant, denied with prejudice) ; cf. Petition
of Esczer (1922, S. D. Tex.) 279 Fed. 792 (nondeclarant, not clear whether
enemy alien, denied without prejudice); see (1924) 22 MICHa. L. REv. 6o3. A
federal statute provides that neutral declarants who, in order to be exempt from
service, withdrew their intentions and thereby in effect canceled their declirations,
are to be forever debarred from naturalization. Act of July 9, 1918 (4o Stat
at L. 885) ; see In re Tomarchio (i92o, E. D. MO.) 269 Fed. 40o, 407. Foreign
countries, invoking treaties and international law, had prevailed upon the Execu-
tive to order the release of their nationals and neutral declarants already inducted
were released from service on application. See Edmunds, Aliens and the Draft
(1920) 5 ST. Louis L. REV. 23; ComENTS (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
683. The court evidently concluded that since exemption of neutral declarants,
assuming they comprised part of the first class in the instant case, was recognized
by treaties and international law and so admitted by the Executive in ordering
their release, it would not be proper to impose the penalty of debarment from
naturalization upon those who sought exemption. The argument of the opinion
in the instant case leads to the inference that the court was influenced in reaching
its conclusion by the acts of the Executive; but it is difficult to understand
why, especially in face of the debarment statute. Cf. (1918) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 83.
BnILs AND NoTEs-N. I. L.-CoNTRUCTION OF SECTION I24.-A check, inad-
vertently antedated by one month, had been cashed by the payee thereof. The
defendant drawer later returned the cash, but the payee avoided returning the
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check by pretending to destroy it. The defendant having stopped payment, the
check was dishonored by the drawee bank when presented by the payee and
was returned to him marked "payment stopped." Although, it seems, the marking
was not negligently done, the payee removed all trace thereof and at once
negotiated the check to the plaintiff for value. The bank again refused payment
and the plaintiff sought recovery from the defendant drawer. From a judgment
against him, the defendant appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed.
Wade Bros. v. Bybee (1924, Idaho) 229 Pac. 662.
The apparent staleness of the paper might have been treated as notice
demanding inquiry so as to deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of
N. I. L. sec. 124. Cf. Fisher v. Leland (1849, Mass.) 4 Gush. 456; but see
McSparran v. Neeley (1879) 91 Pa. 17. Conceding, however, that the plaintiff
was within the provisions of that section, still recovery does not follow as of
course. Before the N. I. L. even as against subsequent holders in due course,
a material alteration of a negotiable instrument avoided the duties of all persons
then liable thereon not consenting to the alteration. Stoddard v. Penniman (1871)
io8 Mass. 366. Under N. I. L. sec. 124, makers and endorsers prior to alteration
are accorded the same protection as at common law, and against all save holders
in due course subsequent to alteration the common law penalty of avoidance is
still in force. First National Bank v. Barnum (19o8, M. D. Pa.) 16o Fed. 245.
As to the latter, the penalty is discontinued and they are permitted to enforce
an altered instrument according to its original tenor. "Original tenor" has
hitherto been construed to mean "tenor as if unaltered," and a plaintiff within
the sedtion gets only the rights he would have got had he taken the instrument
unaltered, with all the transactions subsequent to alteration the same as in fact
*they were. Thus, recovery has been denied in cases involving alteration of the
name of the payee where restoration of "original tenor" would leave a gap in
the plaintiff's chain of title due to the want of endorsement by the true payee.
Andrews v. Sibley (1914) 22o Mass. IO, lO7 N. E. 395; First National Bank v.
Gridley (19o6, 2d Dept.) 112 App. Div. 398, 98 N. Y. Supp. 445; and see Mosko-
witz v. Deutsch (1905, Sup. Ct. App. T.) 46 Misc. 603, 92 N. Y. Supp. 721.
Rights greater than could have been enforced, had the holder taken the instru-
ment unaltered, have not before been given save under N. I. L., sec. 62, which
provides that an acceptor is bound by the tenor of his acceptance. Thus certifi-
cation of a check subsequent to alteration is acceptance binding a bank so certi-
fying to pay according to the altered tenor to holders in due course subsequent
to the certification. National City Bank v. National Bank of the Republic (1921)
300 III. 103, 132 N. E. 832; COMMENTS (1922) 31 YA.E LAW JOURNiAL, 522, 548.
In the instant case the court sought to justify its decision collaterally by finding a
causal relation between the defendant's negligence in not compelling the return of
the check and the appearance of "regularity" which the court apparently thought
was presented to the plaintiff at negotiation. But this negligence was cured by
the defendant's agent, the bank, when it set marks of dishonor on the face of the
check, which have been held, when clear in their import, to preclude an endorsee
from the status of holder in due course. State, ex rel. Hadley, v. Greenville Bank
(1916, Mo. App.) 187 S. W. 597; Spero v. Holoschutz (i9Ol, Sup. Ct App. T.)
74 N. Y. Supp. 852. Obviously restoration in the instant case results in a reap-
pearance of these marks of dishonor-a point the court seems to have overlooked
in its decision.
CoNFLIcr OF LAWS-JUDGMENT OF" FOREGN COUNTRIES AS RES JUDICATA.-In
an action for the value of certain goods, the defendant set up only a prior French
judgment in its favor. The plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings. Held,
that the motion be granted, since France does not accept our judgments as conclu-
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sive. Johnston v. Compagnie Ggnbrale Transatlantique (1924, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.)
123 Misc. 8o6, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 413.
In England, a personal judgment of a court of a foreign country was early held
conclusive evidence of the merits of the case, attackable only for fraud or lack of
jurisdiction. Tarleton v. Tarleton (1&15, K. B.) io5 Eng. Rep. 742; Martin v.
Nicolls (1830, Ch.) 3 Simon's Rep. 458. And a dictum in Walker v. Witter
(1778) I Doug. I, that the judgment was only prima fade evidence, was overruled.
Bank of Australasia v. Nias (1851, Q. B.) 2o L. J. (N. s.) 284 ("prima facie
probably meant subject to impeachment for fraud, etc.") ; Godard v. Gray [1870]
6 Q. B. 139. Some of the American cases ostensibly follow the English dictum.
Tourigny v. Houle (1896) 88 Me. 406, 34 At. I58 ("prima facie presumption
may be overcome by showing fraud") ; Minero v. Ross (i915) Io6 Tex. 522, 172
S. W. 711 (admit evidence of an unfair trial). The majority of courts say that
they will give a judgment of a foreign country "conclusive" effect. Thus, when
the successful plaintiff sues on the judgment, the defendant cannot go into the
merits of the case. Fisher v. Fielding (895) 67 Conn. 91, 34 At. 74; Dunstan
v. Higgins (1893) 138 N. Y. 70, 33 N. E. 729. But both the English and American
courts still follow the doctrine of. non-merger, which originated under the influence
of the dictum in Walker v. Witter, supra. Thus, the successful plaintiff may sue
either on the original cause of action or on the foreign judgment. Swift v. David
.(I9Io, C. C. A. 9th) 181 Fed. 828; Trevelyan v. Myers (I895) 26 Ont. 430;
contra: Alaska Commercial Co. v. Debney (1904) 2 Alaska, 303 (rev'd on another
point 144 Fed. i) ; Jones v. Jandson (i86o) 15 La. Ann. 35. Yet the judgment
may be pleaded as res judicata by the successful defendant. Coveney v. Phlscator
(1903) 132 Mich. 258, 93 N. W. 619; Law v. Hansen (1895) 25 Can. Sup. Ct. 69.
It seems apparent that "conclusive effect" is being given only against the unsuc-
cessful litigant. It is submitted that confusion would be avoided by treating the
judgment as concluding either party from retrying the merits .of the case. i
Piggott, Foreign Judgments (3d ed. 19o8) 28. The instant case seems to be the
first state decision squarely approving the Supreme Court's holding that a foreign
judgment will be given conclusive effect only when reciprocal treatment is accorded
to American judgments. Hilton v. Guyot (1895) 159 U. S. 113, 16 Sup. Ct. i39;
cf. Ritchie v. McMullen (895) 159 U. S. 235, 16 Sup. Ct. 171; MacDonald v.
Grand Trunk Ry. (1902) 71 N. H. 448, 52 At. 982 (reciprocity probably
immaterial).
CONSTrruTIoNAL LAW-FRANCHISE FEES IMPOSED ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-
WHEN VIOLATIVE OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE.-A statute provided that all foreign
corporations having stock -without par value should pay annually a franchise fee
of five cents a share upon that proportion of the number of shares of authorized
common stock represented by the property owned and used and the business
transacted in the state. Gen. Code of Ohio, 1921, sec. 8728-11 as amended by i09
Laws of Ohio, 1921, 277. The plaintiff, a foreign corporation, had issued only
about 12% of its authorized capital stock. All its property was within the state
and its entire business, most of which was interstate, was transacted there. Defen-
dant attempted to collect the fee on the entire number of shares authorized.
Held, that the application of the rate to shares greater in number than the propor-
tion .of outstanding shares attributable to property and business in the state
violated the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, and that the use of the
mere number of non-par value shares, whether only authorized or actually out-
standing, as a basis for imposition oFthe tax, violated the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Air-Way Electric Appliance Co. v. Ohio State
Treasurer (1924) 266 U. S. 71, 45 Sup. Ct 12.
Where a foreign corporation does both an interstate and local business from
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points in several states, the commerce clause prevents the taxation by any one state
of a greater proportion of such corporation's capital stock than can be attributed
to property owned and business done within such taxing state. Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Kansas (191o) 216 U. S. I, 30 Sup. Ct. i9o; International Paper
Co. v. Massachusetts (I918) 246 U. S. 135, 38 Sup. Ct. 292. But where all the
property of a foreign corporation is within the taxing state and all the business
has been transacted there, even though part be interstate, the proportion of capital
stock taxable is ioo per cent. Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Illinoi Secretary of
State (922) 258 U. S. 290, 42 Sup. Ct. 305. In accord with this last case the
proportion used by the defendant in the instant case, viz. IOO per cent., was
unobjectionable. But mere number of shares without more, whether with or
without par value and whether actually outstanding or merely authorized, is no
indication of actual capital and its use as a base in computing the tax results in
unequal fees for equal privileges, thereby violating the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. People of New York, ex rel. Farrington v. Mensching
(19o7) 187 N. Y. 8, 79 N. E. 884. But it does nqt follow that its use also violates
the commerce clause. Nor does that conclusion follow from the rule of Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas and International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, for
in those cases the tax was in effect on property outside the state.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SPEcIFIC PROVISION NOT NECESSARY TO CREATE DuTY OF
UNITED STATES TO COMPENSATE FOR A STATUTORY TAKING.-A statute empowered
the President in time of war to assume control of any system of transportation,
but made no specific provisions for compensation. Act of Aug. 29, 1916 (39 Stat.
at L. 619, 645). Pursuant to the statute the Secretary of War issued an order
taking possession of the Bush Terminal in New York and reciting that compensa-
tion would be paid for the use of the prepiLw&.T-he claimant, lessee of part of the
premises, entered a petition for the value of his interest, which the court of claims
dismissed on the ground that the statute provided no remedy to the owner, and
even assuming government responsibility to him, there was no intent to compen-
sate each lessee. Held, that the judgment be reversed. Ducket and Company
v. The United States (1924) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term. No. io8.
The implied contract, required by the Tucker Act.to give the court of claims
jurisdiction of claims against the United States, is to be inferred as a fact from
the conduct of the parties in the light of all surrounding circumstances, and is to
be distinguished from a quasi-contractual obligation. Sutton v. United States
(1921) 256 U. S. 575, 4i Sup. Ct 563; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. United States
(X923) 261 U. S. 592, 43 Sup. Ct. 425. See NOTES (1923) 36 HARv. L. REV. 866;
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (924) 34 YALE LAw JOURNAL, I, 30.
Where the property is appropriated under a claim of right and in denial of the
title of the claimant, there is no such implied contract. Hill v. United States
(1893) 149 U. S. 593, 13 Sup. Ct ioII; Tempel v. United States (1918) 248
U. S. 121, 39 Sup. Ct. 56. Some 'cases, following the subjective theory of
contracts, have held that where the government officials testified that they thought
that there would be no duty to make compensation, there was no "meeting of the
minds," and consequently no government responsibility. Harley v. United States
(9o5) 198 U. S. 229, 25 Sup. Ct. 634. Or where the appropriation took place
under such circumstances as to negative an intent on the part of the government
officers to pay compensation. Horstmann Co. v. United States (1921) 257 U. S.
138, 42 Sup. Ct. 58. A recent case seems to adopt, however, the objective view,
that no actual intent to pay compensation is necessary, and that the secret inental
processes of the government officials are immaterial. Portmnouth Harbor Land
& Hotel Co. v. United States (1922) 26o U. S. 327, 43 Sup. Ct. 135. Where the
taking is under a statute which contains a provision for compensation, it is clear
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that a contract is to be implied. United States v. North American Transportation
Co. (192o) 253 U. S. 330, 40 Sup. Ct. 518. But in dealing with certain war
statutes, the Supreme Court mentioned by dictum the existence of a provision for
compensation in such statutes. See Mo. Pac. R. R. v. Ault (i9Z1) 256 U. S. 554,
41 Sup. Ct. 593. Cf. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Poston (1921) 256 U. S.
662, 41 Sup. Ct. 598. And thereby the Court of Claims was led to believe that this
was essential to imply a contract. But the decision in the instant case clearly
establishes the contrary.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ToRT RESPONSIBILITY OF MILITIA WHILE ASSISTING CIVIL
AUTHORITIES IN ENFORCING LA.-In obedience to a general order of the
governor of the state, defendants, as officers in charge, took a detachment of
militia to aid a sheriff in enforcing the state prohibition law and to protcet the
users of the highways from lawless automobile drivers. The governor verbally
authorized placing a log across the highway to stop cars which did not do so
when ordered. As a result of placing the log in the highway, the plaintiff's car
was ditched and the plaintiff injured. To his suit the defendants set up in defence
that under a state statute they were immune from prosecution by the civil authori-
ties and from civil liability. The lower court, holding that the interpretation
contended for would render the statute unconstitutional, gave judgment for the
plaintiffs and the defendants brought error. Held, that the judgment be affirmed.
Bishop v. Vandercook (1924, Mich.) 2oo'N. W. 278.
A soldier is responsible for his acts under civil and military law. A declara-
tion of martial law, which includes all law, civil and military, administered by the
military forces of the state, alters his responsibility but little. However he is
then not responsible civilly for acts done in good faith and in the reasonable
belief that facts existed which would have justified his conduct from a military
standpoint. Luther v. Borden (1849, U. S.) 7 How. I; Moyer v. Peabody (i9o9)
212 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 235. But where he does not act in good faith or in the
reasonable belief that such facts existed, he is liable in a civil action just as a
private citizen would be. 2 Willoughby, Constitutional Law (191o) sec 727;
cf. Luther v. Borden, supra, at p. 46. Neither civil nor military law frees him
from the obligations imposed by or takes from him the protection of the other
system. Little v. Barreme (1804, U. S.) 2 Cranch, 170; Dinsman v. Wilkes (1851,
U. S.) 12 How. 390; 2 Willoughby, op. cit. sec. 704 et seq. So a sentence
imposed by court martial within its jurisdiction is not subject to review by any
civil court. Johnson v. Sayre (1895) 158 U. S. 1O9, 15 Sup. Ct. 773; Reaves v.
Ainsworth (1911) 219 U. S. 296, 31 Sup. Ct. 230; contra: People ex rel. Higgins
v. Stotesbury (1918, 2d Dept.) 182 App. Div. 691, 169 N. Y. Supp. 998; see
Lobb, Civil Authority versus Military (1919) 3 MINN. L. REv. 105, 113. Also,
orders of a superior officer are no defence to a civil action of tort. Little v.
Barreme, supra; Bates v. Clark (1877) 95 U. S. 204; contra: Herlihy v. Donahue
(916) 52 Mont. 6Ol, 161 Pac. 164. This is true even during active warfare.
Mitchell v. Harmony (1851, U. S.) 13 How. 115. So too, statutes tending to
free officers of militia from civil liability when acting in good faith have been
questioned as to their constitutionality. O'Shee v. Stafford (19o8) 122 La. 444,
47 So. 764; cf. McLaughlin v. Kipp (19o3, 2d Dept.) 82 App. Div. 413, 81 N. Y.
Supp. 896; Lobb, op. cit. at p. iog. The importance of such a holding arises
from the fact that by our law, the government is not liable for the torts of its
officers. The decision in the instant case is in accord with precedent, but a more
desirable result would be to make the government liable for the torts of its
officers acting in good faith, thus practically shifting the burden from the officer
to the state which should bear it.' See generally, Borchard, Government Liability
in Tort (1924-25) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1, 129, 229.
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CoNmTcrs-SALE OF BusINEss-PoMIsE NOT TO COMPETE-AsSIGNMENT OF
VENDEE'S RIGHT.-Two partners sold their business to certain persons, their
assigns, etc., permittng incorporation under the vendors' name and promising the
vendees (not mentioning assigns) not to compete within a limited time and space
so long as the vendees should continue in the business. The vendees formed the
A corporation using the vendors' name and sold all the stock therein to the B
corporation, which continued the business, still using the vendors' name. The
vendors then organized the competing C corporation against which the A corpora-
tion sought an injunction, joining as defendants the original vendors. The lower
court granted the injunction and the defendant appealed. Held, that the order be
affirmed. Jochum Bros. Inc. v. Ridgewood Pie Baking Co. (1924, App. Div.
ist Dept.) 206 N. Y. Supp. 252.
A promise not to compete, reasonably limited in time and space, in a contract
for the sale of a business is not in unlawful restraint of trade. Diamond Match
Co. v. Roeber (1887) io6 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419. The vendee's right there-
under is assignable to a subsequent purchaser of the business. Graca v. Rodrigues
(1907) 33 Calif. App. 296, I65 Pac. lO12; 22 A. L. R. 754, note. The assign-
ment may be made without express words. American Ice Co. v. Meckel (19o5,
Ist Dept.) io9 App. Div. 93, 95 N. Y. Supp. io6o. And the original promise
need not mention the vendee's assigns. Hedge v. Lowe (1877) 47 Iowa, 137.
But the promise may be expressly limited to the continuance of the vendee in the
business sold. Barron v. Collenbaugh (19O1) 114 Iowa, 71, 86 N. W. 53. In the
instant case there were two transactions--iz., the incorporation and the sale
of all the stock-neither of which the court was willing to declare an assignment
within the meaning of the contract in spite of the fact that their combined result
was to place the right against competition in persons not a party to the original
contract The permission to incorporate in the vendors' name obviously shows
that such incorporation was not to be construed as an assignment. But it seems
wrong to hold that because the fictitious legal person continued to exist, there
was no assignment, although all the stock was transferred to a third person.
Cf. I A. L. R. 61o, note; Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity (1912)
12 COL. L. RPv. 496. Especially is this true in the instant case where the pur-
chaser has greatly expanded the business in territory and customers.
DAMAGES-MITIGATION BY INJURED PARTY ON BREAcH OF CoNTRAcT.-After
the plaintiff had partly installed a sprinkler system in the W factory under
contract, the W Co. became bankrupt and the defendant receiver paid the plaintiff
for that part of the system installed, refusing to have the work continued. The
receiver sold to the X Co. who had the plaintiff complete the installation under an
independent contract. The plaintiff sued the receiver for the profit he would have
made had he been allowed to complete the work under the original contract. In
spite of the breach, the lower court found a "duty" on the plaintiff to mitigate
damages and disallowed the plaintiff's claim. Held, that the judgment be reversed
and a new trial granted. Grinnell Co. v. Voorhees (1924, C. C. A. 3d) I Fed.
(2d) 693.
If the plaintiff's commodity under the contract is limited, his damages in a suit
for breach of the contract will be mitigated by what he earned or might reasonably
have earned because of his freedom from obligation under the original contract.
Oldewurtel v. Wiesenfeld (19o3) 97 Md. 165, 54 Atl. 969 (covenant to lease
certain land) ; Jameson v. Board of Education (1916) 78 W. Va. 612, 89 S. E.
255 (contract requiring personal services); see (1920) 34 H.Av. L. Rsv. 217.
It is said, where the commodity under the contract is practically unlimited, the
plaintiff is entitled to the full profit of every contract he can secure. Sullivan v.
McMillan (1896) 37 Fla. 134, 19 So. 340 (contract for work, personal service not
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required); Hollerbach & May v. Wilkins (1908) 13o Ky. 51, 112 S. W. 1126
(contract to purchase, plaintiff having practically unlimited supply); but see
Miller v. Mariner's Church (830) 7 Me. 51. But even then, where the plaintiff
could reasonably lessen the damages on notice of the breach by the exercise of due
care for the mutual interests of the parties, his damages will be reduced accord-
ingly in a suit for breach of the contract. Dillon v. Anderson (1870) 43 N. Y.
231 (manufacturer has a no-right to damages incurred after notice of repudia-
tion) ; Payzu, Ltd. v. Saunders [1919] 2 K. B. 581 (reasonable oportunity to buy
against breach). A more useful statement would seem to be that the repudiator
should not be entitled to the benefit of any contract of the injured party except
such as the injured party could not have made but for the repudiation. Beale,
Damages upon, Rep dation of a Contract (19o8) 17 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 443,
455; Frazier v. Clark (1889) 88 Ky. 26o, io S. W. 8o6 (contract to saw lumber
exclusively for repudiator); Harrington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstroin Co. (1911)
166 Mich. 276, 131 N. W. 559 (contract to make machines for repudiator's
company, output taken over by third party). But see Olds v. Mapes-Reeve Co.
(1goo) 177 Mass. 41, 58 N. E. 478. That the plaintiff in the instant case could
not have secured the second contract but for the breach of the first, is obvious.
Inasmuch as the second contract was a continuation of the same work involved
in the first one, the plaintiff is deriving double profits from a single specified
undertaking, which seems hardly consonant with the compensatory nature of the
damages. See Rockefeller v. Merritt (1896, C. C. A. 8th) 76 Fed. 909, 917. In
any event, the plaintiff is never under a duty to mitigate damages, for that implies
that he might become subject to an action for breach of the duty. A more accurate
statement is thatthe plaintiff has a no-right to, i. e. compensation will not be
allowed for, damages which he might have prevented, the damages recoverable by
him being identical in amount whether he takes steps to mitigate the loss or not.
Rock v. Vandine (1920) io6 Kan. 588, I89 Pac. 157; see (I919) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 130, (1924) 33 ibid. 659.
DAMAGES-NEGLIGENCE---RECOVERY ALLOWED FOR DEATH INDUCED BY FEAR OF
INjuRY TO ANOTHER.-The defendant's motor-lorry, negligently left standing
at the top of an incline in a street, began to run down the incline and struck and
injured the plaintiff's child. The plaintiff's wife suffered a shock and shortly
thereafter died. The plaintiff claims damages under Lord Campbell's Act. The
lower court instructed the jury that the plaintiff could not recover unless it was
proved that the shock was due to the wife's fear of injury to herself. The plain-
tiff appealed on the ground of misdirection as to right to recover. Held, (one
justice, dissenting)- that a new trial be granted. Hainbrook v. Stokes Bros.
Limited (1924, C. A.) 41 T. L. R. 125.
The earlier cases refused recovery for injury resulting from shock where there
was no actual impact. Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas (1888) 13
A. C. 22>; Lehman v. Brooklyn City Ry. (1888, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 47 Hun. 355.
But such recovery is now allowed in England, Scotland, and Ireland. Dulieu v.
White [igoil] 2 K. B. 669; Gilligan v. Robb (igio) 47 Scot. L. R. 733; Bell v.
Great Northern Ry. of Ir. (I89o) 26 L. R. Ir. 428. The American cases are in
conflict but the prevailing view seems to favor recovery. Purcell v. St. Paul Ry.
(1892) 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034; Mack v. South Bound Ry. (i898) 52 S. C.
323, 29 S. E. 905; Throckmorton, Damages for Fright (1920) 34 HARV. L. REv.
260; i Sedgwick, Damages (9th ed. 1912) sec. 43 h; see CoMMENs (919) 17
MicH. L. REv. 407; contra: Ewing v. Pittsburg Ry. (1892) 147 Pa. 40, 23 Atl.
34o; Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry. (i897) 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88. But not
where the plaintiff's fright proceeds from fear of injury to another. Cleveland
Ry. v. Stewart (igoo) 24 Ind. App. 374; see Southern Ry. v. Jackson (1916-) 146
Ga. 243, 91 S. E. 28; conti:a: Spearman v. McCrary (1912) 4 Ala. App. 473.
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But there is an apparent tendency to allow a recovery even where the fear is for
another, especially where the wrong is "wilful." See Lambert v. Brewster (1924,
W. Va.) 125 S. E. 244.
EASEMENTs-LRD CAmNS' Acr-PowR OF CHANCERY To AwAr PROSPECTIVE
DAMAGES.-The defendant was preparing to replace his old building with a new
one which would interfere with the plaintiff's easement of "ancient lights" to a
degree that the lower court found not material. The plaintiff claimed an injunc-
tion to prevent this obstruction. Lord Cairns' Act provides that in cases where a
court of chancery may allow an injunction, it shall now be empowered to "award
damages to the party injured either in addition to or in substitution for such
injunction . . .in such manner as the court may direct." (1858) 21 & 22 Vict.,
c. 27, sec. 2. The lower court in granting an injunction held that this act
conferred no power to award damages where no injury had in fact occurred.
Held, (two judges dissenting) that the judgment be reversed. Leeds Industrial
Co-Operative Society v. Slack (1924, H. L.) 131 L. T. 710.
Under Lord Cairns' Act damages have often been awarded in lieu of an injunc-
tion to compensate for injuries actually suffered. Holland v. Worley (1884)
L. R. 26 Ch. 578; Ease)ewnt of Light--Sir Hugh Cairns' Act (1865) 4o L. T.
495, 518, 543, 41 L. T. 3; Radcliffe, Easement of Light and Air and its Limita-
tions under English Law (19o8) 24 L. QuART. REv. 120, 247; Gale, Law of
Easements (9th ed. 1916) 529. The present court considered itself justified by
the term "in substitution for" in granting damages wholly prospective. Previous
authority seems to disfavor such a result. Cowper v. Laidler [1903] 2 Ch. 337;
see Dreyfus v. Peruvian Guano Co. (i8go) L. IL 43 Ch. 316, 333; cf. Martin v.
Price [1894] I Ch. 276; Litchfield-Speer v. Queen Anne's Gate Syndicate [igig]
i Ch. 407, 415 (granting an injunction rather than damages for threatened
injuries). The decision is doubtless actuated by a consideration of the "balance
of conveniences." The practical difficulty of accurately estimating future damages
may constitute an objection to the result. But in the analogous situation of an
anticipatory breach of contract such damages are frequently granted. Frost v.
Knight (1872) L. R- 7 Exch. iii; Roehin v. Horst (igoo) 178 U. S. i, 2o
Sup. Ct. 780 (plaintiff cannot recover damages he might have mitigated, how-
ever); cf. Hochster v. De La Tour (1853, Q. B.) 2 EL & Bl. 678; 3 Williston,
Contracts (I92O) secs. i296-1314. It is also argued that by "balancing the con-
veniences" the small property holder is summarily forced to surrender his property
without legislative decree. See Stokes v. City Ofices Co. (1865, Ch.) 12 L. T. R.
(N. s.) 6o2, 603; Chafee, Progress of the Law (1920) 34 HmAv. L. REV. 388, 392;
Cox, Law and Science of Ancient Lights (2d ed. 1871) 89. And that to force
him to do so is to set a price at which such deprivation may be legally effected
for the benefit of a private individual. See Krehl v. Burrell (1877, Ch.) io Eng.
Rul. Cas. 307; cf. Hennessy v. Carnony (1892) 5o N. J. Eq. 616, 25 Atl. 374
(nuisance) ; Damages in Liei of Injunction (1903) 47 SOT. JoUR. 776; Goddard,
Law of Easements (8th ed. 192) 433 (prospective damages). On the other hand
the result of the instant case is supported by the argument that the community
welfare demands a minimum of restriction upon its social and industrial develop-
ment. It is believed that courts are often affected, perhaps unconsciously, by the
hardship.of forcing a progressive property-holder to respect prescriptive rights, the
acquisition of which he could have prevented only at his extreme inconvenience.
The increasing conflict might be somewhat alleviated by legislative intervention
providing more expedient means of preventing the perfection of these servitudes.
Cf. Dunball v. Walters (1865, Ch.) 12 L. T. R. (N. s.) 759, 760; Injunctions
against Continuing Nuisances (Igoo) 14 HARv. L. Rxv. 458; Combe, Proposed
Alterations in the Law of Light (1923) 68 SOL. JouR. 55; see 161 L. QuART.
REV. (1925) 3.
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EMINENT DOmAIN-LEssEE WITH MERE OPTION OF RENEWAL NOT ENTITLED TO
DAMAGES.-The petitioner claimed damages under eminent domain proceedings.
Mass. Gen. Acts, 1915, ch. 252, sec. 6. The petitioner had a three year lease of
premises, with a privilege of renewal for three more years. Before the expiration
of the term, but after the institution of the eminent domain proceedings, he notified
the owner of his desire to exercise his option, but no formal instrument was
executed, and he remained in possession until actual entry by the county, four
months after the original lease expired. The lower court held for the defendant,
on the ground that the petitioner, being a mere tenant at will, was not entitled to
damages for the taking of the property. Held, that the judgment be affirmed.
Hanna v. Inhabitants of Hampden County (1924, Mass.) 145 N. E. 258.. Courts do not extend protection to an inchoate right of dower taken under
eminent domain proceedings. Flynn v. Flynn (1898) 171 Mass. 312, 50 N. E.
650; contra: Wheeler v. Kirtland (1875) 27 N. J. Eq. 534. And refuse compen-
sation for a "possibility of reverter." Reformed Church v. Croswell (1924, 3d
Dept.) 21o App. Div. 294, 206 N. Y. Supp. 132; (1925) 34 YALE LAw JOUR I. ,
444. Protection is denied on the grounds that the interest taken amounted to a
mere "expectancy" and was too remote and difficult of evaluation. Massachu-
setts has refused damages to a lessee for his option to purchase premises. Smelting
Co. v. Boston &.P. R. R. (1911) 209 Mass. 298, 95 N. E. 887. However, the lessee
in that case was not remediless as he could secure the money received in compen-
sation, by paying the lessor the option price. Smelting Co. v. Boston & P. R. R.
supra, at p. 307. But it has been held that an "expectation of renewal" is an
important element to be considered in assessing damages in condemnation proceed-
ings. Baltimore v. Rice (18qi) 73 Md. 307, 21 Atl. 181; McGoldrick v. King
(i9o2) 8 Can. Exch. 169 (lessor to pay for improvements or renew the lease);
contra: Emery v. Terminal Co. (19ol) 178 Mass. 172, 59 N. E. 763. And where
the lessor covenants to renew, on the ground that this covenant adds to the value of
the tenant's interest, such added value is allowed to the tenant. N. Penna. R. R. v.
Davis (1856) 26 Pa. 238; Storms v. Manhattan Ry. (19o4) 178 N. Y. 493, 71
N. E. 3. It has also been held that a tenant on the land under a lease, perpetual
at his option, was entitled to money damages. Storm Lake v. S. C. R. R. (1883)
62 Iowa, 218, 17 N. W. 489. If the lease had been renewed, though after notice of
taking, the lessee would undoubtedly have been entitled to compensation. Kearney
v. Metro. Ry. (1891) 129 N. Y. 76, 29 N. E. 70; cf. Herron v. City of Pittsburgh
(1924, Pa.) 127 Atl. 64. Furthermore, in a case of an agreement by the lessor,
enforceable in equity, to allow the lessee to remain on the premises, this equitable
interest of the tenant was considered in assessing damages. In re King's Lease-
hold Estates (1873) L. R. 16 Eq. 521. In the principal case the petitioner had
undoubtedly an equitable right to renewal: Now, under the Massachusetts law the
plaintiff was rightly judged a tenant at will. Leavitt v. Maykell (igog) 203 Mass.
5o6, 89 N. E. lo56; I Tiffany, Real Property .(2d ed. 192o) 234. And, admittedly,
under ordinary circumstances, a mere tenant at will has not such an interest in the
land as to entitle him to compensatory damages under condemnation proceedings.
Lyons v. Phila. & R. Ry. (1904) 209 Pa. 550, 58 Atl. 924; I Nichols, Eminent
Domain (2d ed. 1917) 339; but see Sheehan v. City of Fall River (igo5) 187
Mass. 356, 73 N. E. 544. On that ground the court rested its decision in the
instant case. Perhaps it might have looked farther to see a distinguishing circum-
stance, i. e. the valuable property right which the plaintiff had in his option of
renewal, for it would seem that the plaintiff's power to secure a renewal is a
property right within the meaning of the "due process" clause. Cf. Brooks-
Scanlon Corp. v. United States (1924) 265 U. S. I6, 44 Sup. Ct. 471; Dodd,
Impairment of the Obligation of Contract (1909) 4 ILL. L. REV. 155. Certainly
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the objections to protecting the "expectant" interests, mentioned above, are not
applicable here. The defendant has deprived the plaintiff of a valuable property
right, which is definite and easily valued and there seems to be no sufficient reason
for denying him compensation therefor.
EViDENcE-CONFESSiONS-ADmISSmBI.y DEPENDING ON ILLNESS OF PRISONER.-
The petitioner was convicted of murder. A signed confession had been procured
after insistent questioning at a time when the prisoner was so ill that, according
to unrefuted medical testimony, he "would be liable to sign a confession that
would lead him to the gallows ... if he wanted to be left alone." This was
admitted in evidence. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed
the conviction on the ground that the statement had not been procured by promises
or threats. A writ of certiorari was obtained. Held, that the conviction be
reversed, as the prisoner's statement was involuntary. Ziang Sung Wan v. United
States (Oct. 13, i924) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, ig24, no. 127.
In the federal courts a confession is admissible if "voluntary," and it is "invol-
untary" if induced by promises or threats. Brain v. United States (1897) 168
U. S. 532, i8 Sup. Ct. 183. But the instant case is not the usual one where the
inducement offered or compulsion exercised by the interrogator is the operative
fact. The real basis for rejecting the confession was the condition of the prisoner,
making the confession untrustworthy. The sound result reached by the Supreme
Court shows that the "voluntary" rule is but a rule of thumb to measure trust-
worthiness, the real consideration. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) 170
passim; (1922) 21 MIcH. L. REv. 933.
Goo vmuL-No Dun" ON VENDOR NOT TO COmPETE WITH VENDEE.-The defen-
dant had sold to the plaintiff his self-serving store business "and the goodwill
belonging thereto established and built up by me under my own name and the name
'Piggly Wiggly,'." together with the trade name, "Piggly Wiggly." The defen-
dant's personal name, Clarence Saunders, had been constantly advertised in con-
nection with the name "Piggly Wiggly" "so as to fix his name in the minds of the
public as practically necessarily connected therewith." Defendant proposed to
open a self-serving store under the name of "Clarence Saunders Stores System."
Plaintiff obtained a temporary injunction against such action on the ground that it
would injure him as vendee of the goodwill. Held, that the injunction be modified
to permit defendant to engage in the self-serving store busihess under his own name
so long as he does not lead the public to believe his store is the old "Piggly
Wiggly" or the old Saunders system of stores. Piggly Wiggly Corporation v.
Saunders (1924, W. D. Tenn.) z Fed. (2d) 572.
Goodwill is of trade value to the vendee to the extent of the vendor's duty not
to compete. The minority recognize the economic function of transferring to the
vendee this increment of value earned by the vendor and impose on the vendor the
duty not to compete in fact with the vendee. See (924) 34 YALE LAw JOURNAL,
ioi. Thus the vendee has paid his money to some purpose. Wentsel v. Barbin
(1899) i89 Pa. 502, 42 Atl. 44; Gordon v. Knott (i9o8) ig Mass. 173, 85 N. E.
184; Brown v. Benrzinger (1912) 118 Md. 29, 84 Atl. 79. But the majority of
courts say that the only legal consequence of a "sale of goodwill" is the imposi-
tion on the vendor of a duty not to solicit personally old customers. Trego v.
Hunt [1896, H. L.] A. C. 7; L. R. A. 1918 F, 1179 note; contra: Cottrell v.
Babcock (I886) 54 Conn. 122, 6 Atl. 791 (solicitation allowed). It would seem
that the reasons" which induce the imposition of this duty would induce the imposi-
tion of a duty not to compete in other ways, in accord with the minority view.
Or such a duty might be imposed on the analogy of warranties. See Diwight v.
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Hamilton (1873) 113 Mass. 175, 177. But apparently a duty not to compete is
not imposed even where there is an express "warranty" of goodwill. Costello v.
Eddy (I89o, Sup. Ct.) 58 Hun, 6o5, 12 N. Y. Supp. 236. The instant case unfor-
tunately follows the majority view in permitting the vendor to compete with the
vendee except where he has expressly bound himself otherwise. Von Bremen v.
MacMonnies (igio) 2oo N. Y. 41, 93 N. E. 186. And even to re-engage in the
same business in his. own name so long as he does not hold himself out to the
public as continuing the old business. Hall's Appeal (1869) 6o Pa. 458; Ranft v.
Reimers (1902) 200 Ill. 386, 65 N. E. 720; White v. Trowbridge (i9o6) 216 Pa.
I, 64 Atl. 862. Any use of defendant's personal name, which had acquired a
trade value identified with the trade name expressly sold, would materially reduce
the value of the goodwill which the plaintiff bought. An express agreement seems
generally necessary to divest a man of the privilege of doing business in his own
name. Guth Chocolate Co. v. Guth (1914, D. C. Md.) 215 Fed. 750; see (192-3)
33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 562. But a man's privilege of using his name in business
is limited even in the unfair competition cases where no vendor-vendee relation
exists. Chickering v. Chickering and Sons (1914, C. C. A. 7th) 215 Fed. 49o;
Coty v. Parfuins de Grande Luxe (1924, C. C. A. 2d) 298 Fed. 865; see (1921)
6 ST. Louis L. REv. 188. And the purpose of the limitations is protection of the
prior competitor's earned increments of value by preventing deception of the public.
See L. E. Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen Co. (1914) 235 U. S,. 88, 35 Sup. Ct. 91;
(1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 626. So where, as in the instant case, such relation does
exist, it would seem at least equally desirable to limit the vendor's use of his name
so as to protect the vendee adequately. It is believed that on the facts of the
instant case the orthodox limitation imposed is not adequate.
INsURANcE-PER !IssIVE USE UNDER "OMNIBUS COVERAGE CLAusE" OF Auro-
moBILE PoLIcy.-An automobile liability policy indemnified third persons "while
riding in or legally operating the automobile" with permission of the owner. A
obtained permission to take the insured's car to go home to change his clothes.
En route he stopped at a saloon, met B, C and D, agreed to drive them to their
homes and in so doing skidded the car into a tree, killing B. B's administrator
secured a judgment against A, which the defendant company refused to pay. The
court below reserved for advice the question whether or not A's deviation was
permissive within the terms of the policy. Held, (two judges dissenting) that
such "ilight deviations" were "too unimportant" to place A "in the position of
one unlawfully using the car." Dickinson v. Maryland Casmalty Co. (1924) IOI
Conn. 369, 125 At. 866.
Under the "driving beyond" doctrine an action for conversion will lie against
the bailee' for any deviation from the terms of the bailment. Disbrow v.
Tenbroeck (1855, N. Y.) 4 Smith, 397; see Wheelock v. Wheelwright (1809) 5
Mass. 1O4; but cf. Daugherty v. Reveal (1913) 54 Ind. App. 71, 1O2 N. E. 381.
But something more than a mere deviation by a servant from his master's mission
is necessary to relieve the master of responsibility for injuries to third parties.
McKiernan v. Lehinaier (1911) 85 Conn. 111, 81 Atl. 969; Fleischner v. Durgin
(1911I) 207 Mass. 435, 93 N. E. Sol; see also Butler v. Hyperion Theatre Co.
(1924) OO Conn. 551, 124 Atl. 22o (breach of express order). Whether there
was a deviation in the former instance or whether there was enough more than a
mere deviation in the latter are questions of fact. Ritchie v. Walker (1893) 63
Conn. 155, 28 Atl. 29; Mechem, Outlines of Agency (3d ed. 1923) sec. 525;
Blashfield, Instructions for Juries (2d ed. 1916) secs. 975-977. So, in the instant
case, although the interpretation by the court of "permissive" should be liberal, it
seems a stretch of this principle that the application of this interpretation to a case
of first impression be determined- as a matter of law.
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MASTER AND SERVANT-RESPONSIBILITY FOR WRONGFUL AcTs OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS EmPLoYE.D BY PRivATE PERsoNs.-The defendant corporation paid one
Nicholson to keep order on its property and had him appointed as deputy sheriff
that he might make arrests. Nicholson wrongfully assaulted the plaintiff in a
street of an unincorporated manufacturing community substantially all of which,
including the streets, the defendant owned and for which it supplied protection
in the absence of any municipal police. Evidence showing that Nicholson was a
servant of the defendant acting in the scope of his employment was excluded
below, the trial court finding for the defendant. Held, that the judgment be
reversed. Walters v. Stonewall Cotton Mills (1924, Miss.) 1oi So. 495.
An employer is responsible for the wrongful acts within the scope of employ-
ment of a paid police official engaged to protect the employer's interests. Layne
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. (19o9) 66 W. Va. 607, 69 S. E. 700. But where the
wrongdoer's act is in furtherance of the public peace and not primarily to protect
the employer's interests, the employer is generally freed of liability. Penn-
sylvania R. R. v. Kelly (igio, C. C. A. 2d) 177 Fed. i89. See i7 Ann. Cas. 638,
note; Ann. Cas. 1913 D, II3, note; 30 L. R.A. (N. S.) 481, note. What capacity
the wrongdoer was acting in is generally a question for the jury; and in the
instant case the evidence was properly held admissible. Sharp v. Erie R. R.
(i9o6) 184 N. Y. 1OO, 76 N. E. 923; Rand v. Butte Electric Ry. (Ipo) 40 Mont.
398, 107 Pac. 87.
PARTNERSHIP-GARNISEHMENT BY CREDITOR OF ONE PARTNER OF DEBT OWED
TO FiRm.-Plaintiff, a judgment creditor of defendant partner, filed a garnish-
ment affidavit asking that a summons be issued to a debtor of the partnership.
,The debtor admitted the indebtedness. Defendant moved to dissolve the garnish-
ment on the ground that until there was a partnership accounting, a debt owing
to the firm could not be garnished to satisfy a judgment against an individual
partner. The lower court gave judgment for the defendant and plaintiff
appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Sartain v. Cowherd (1924,
Okla.) 229 Pae. 408.
A partner has no separate interest in any specific asset of the firm. Whig-
ham's Appeal (i869) 63 Pa. 194; Skavdale v. Moyer (1899) 21 Wash. io, 56
Pac. 841. His interest is an exclusively equitable right to his proportionate
share of what remains after payment of firm debts and "advances" by the other
partner as shown by an accounting. (1913) 13 CoL. L. REv. 341. By the major-
ity view it is this conditional right only that is subject to levy for an individual
debt. Lovins v. Laub (1914, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 85 Misc. 336, 147 N. Y. Supp.
304; 2 Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership (i916) sec. 820. And a partner,
attaching creditor, or firm creditor can enjoin the sale of such "interest" until
it is ascertained by an accounting. Cogswell v. Wilson (i888) 17 Or. 31, 21
Pac. 388 (attaching individual creditor); Washburn v. Bank of Bellows Falls
(1847) ig Vt. 278 (firm creditor); Parker v. Merritt (1883) 105 Ill. 293
(partner); contra: Brewster v. Hannnet & Lane (1823) 4 Conn. 540. Unless
such accounting is had, the buyer gets only the chance that the debtor partner's
"interest" may be worth something of value on dissolution, but gets no title to
specific firm assets. Donellan v. Hardy (1877) 57 Ind. 393. The modern view
against an application of firm assets to individual debts subserves the interest
of preserving the "going concern." See Uniform Partnership Act, sec. :25 (c).
Since to allow garnishment before accounting to reach a debt due the firm would
enable the individual creditor to jeopardize this policy, garnishment does not lie
for an "indefinite' or exclusively equitable claim except by statute. Herman v.
New York (i909, ist Dept.) 13o App. Div. 531, 114 N. Y. Supp. iio7; Porter
v. Hartley (1923) 67 Mont. 244, 216 Pac. 344. Hence the instant case seems
sound. Peoples' Bank v. Schryock (1877) 48 Md. 427; Crescent Insurance Co.
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v. Bear (1887) 23 Fla. 5o,. I So. 318. But some courts have allowed garnish-
ment of a partner's interest in a debt due the firm by assuming such interest
and applying the discredited theory that partners were tenants in common of the
assets. Wallace v. Patterson (1790, Md.) 2 Harr. & M. H. 463; Hill v. Beach
(1858) 12 N. J. Eq. 31; Wallace v. Hull (1859) 28 Ga. 68. This has reference
to the old view that separate tangible assets of the firm could be attached and
sold without regard to equities of partners or firm creditors. Heydon v. Heydon
(1693, K. B.) i Salk. 392; see Harlan. v. Moriarty (85o, Iowa) 2 Greene, 486.
Some courts have allowed garnishment of a firm debt by a creditor of a surviving
partner, since he is treated by the common law court as "owner" of the firm
effects. Berry v. Harris (1864) 22 Md. 3o. The result though not the theory
of these cases seems desirable. Hence Where the firm is solvent and the other
partner before the court, there would seem to be no objection to allowing gar-
nishment of a firm debt by an individual creditor, subject to a determination in the
same suit of the debtor partner's exact share in the debt garnished. By allowing
a small claim to be used to pay a small debt, the formality of an accounting
would be avoided and the "going concern" preserved. See Cox v. Russell (1876)
44 Iowa, 556; Hoaglin v. Henderson (19o3) up Iowa, 720, 94 N. W. 247; cf.
(i921) 2o MicH. L. REv. 96; Moore v. Gilmore (1896) 16 Wash. 123, 47 Pac.
239 (garnishment of the share of one joint creditor in a debt allowed in a code
action where both creditors were before the court) ; contra: Badger Lumber Co.
v. Stern (0905) 123 Wis. 618, ioi N. W. 1O93
PIEADING-INJuRY TO REALTY AND PERsONALTY CREATEs ONLY LocAL CAUSE
OF AcTioN.-Water from the defendant's building in New York seeped through
an intervening party wall into an adjoining building of which plaintiff was lessee.
In an action for damages for the resulting injury to the furniture and for repairs
and loss of use of the building, the lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff,
and the defendant appealed. Held, that the judgment be reversed. Van Ommmen
v. Hogeman (1924, N. J. L.) 126 AtI. 468.
While expressing personal disapproval of the rule that actions for injuries to
realty are triable at the situs of the realty only, most courts have given effect to
it Lizingston, v. Jefferson (1811, C. C. D. Va.) i Brock. 203; Pittsburgh C. C.
& St. L. R. R. v. Jackson, (1io) 83 Ohio St. 13, 93 N'E. 26o; (1925) 25 CoL. L.
REv. 239; contra: Little v. Chicago etc. R. R. (1896) 65 Minn. 48, 52, 67 N. W.
846. And in Louisiana this distinction between "local" and "transitory" actions
is not operative at all. Holmnes v. Barclay (849) 4 La. Ann. 63. While changes
in the law of venue no longer require that trial be had in the county where realty
was injured, the rule is still applied to injuries to land without the state. British
South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Moqambique [1893, H. L.] A. C. 6o2. Another
impediment to the plaintiff's action in the instant case is the notion that only a
single "right" resulting from a single "cause of action" exists when realty and
personalty are injured together, and that that is a "local right." Ellenwood v.
Marietta Chair Ca. (1895) I58U. S. 1o5, I5 Sup. Ct. 771. But seeJacobusv. Colgate
(1916) 217 N. Y. 235, II N. E. 837. In asserting that there was but a "local"
right, the court states its conclusion only, and not a universal premise. For where
there is a trespass and a conversion at the same time, courts have taken jurisdic-
tion and given judgment for the conversion, though the trespass was committed in
another state. Bruheimn v. Stratton (1911) 145 Wis. 271, 129 N. W. io92; contra:
Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co. supra. For a more flexible view of the concepts
"right" and "cause" of action, see Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33
YALE LAW JOURMAL, 817, 837. Because of the apparent inevitability of the rule
that actions for injuries to real property may be tried only in the courts of the
situs, the instant case may be considered sound, however, in that it paves the way
for the litigation of all the questions involved at one time. But to retain a rule
when the reasons for it have disappeared may conceivably work injustice; and the
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rule here involved "rests upon no living principle of logic or policy, but upon a
historical accident." Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law (1922)
32; cf. Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Colletted Legal Papers (192o) 187;
Lehman, The Influence of the Universities on Judicial Decision (1924) 1o CoaN.
L. QuART. i. It is to be hoped that the step taken by New York in abolishing by
statute the distinctions between "local" and "transitory" actions will be the
forerunner of similar legislation elsewhere. (1913) N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. sec.
982a; see Jacobus v. Colgate, supra.
PuBLIc SER IcE LAw-FoREcLosuRE SALE OF RAILROAD PROPERTY-PRVIEGE OF
STATE TO I1TERVENm.-On default of payment of bonds secured by mortgage a
foreclosure was ordered against the defendant, an intrastate railroad. The decree
provided that certain equipment be offered as one parcel, certain real estate as
another, and the rest of the railroad property as a third, the master to note the
bids. The third parcel was then to be offered in eighteen parts, and if the total
offered for these surpassed the bids offered for it as an entirety they were to be
accepted. The Attorney General moved for leave to file an intervening petition
to modify the decree. The motion was denied on the grounds that purchasers of
the parcels. would take them charged with the duty to the public to which the
original owner was subject and that therefore the public had no interest in the
decree. Held, (three judges dissenting) that the judgment be affirmed. Equitable
Trust Co. v. Chicago, P. & St. L. R. R. (1924, Ill.) 145 N. E. 290.
A court will not order discontinuance of a railroad by a proceeding in which the
state is not a party without the consent of the state. Anderson v. Dent (I920) 79
Fla. 85I, 85 So. 15I; People ex rel. Hubbard v. Colorado Title & T. Co. (1918)
65 Colo. 472, 178 Pac. 6; see NoTEs (1919) 32 HAv. L. REv. 716. And a prohi-
bition excluding from the decree words purporting to authorize the dismantling of
a railroad does not violate the Constitution nor cut down the purchaser's "rights."
Bullock v. Florida ex rel. R. R. Commission (1921) 254 U. S. 513, 41 Sup. Ct.
193. But if the state has been represented, the court will dispose of a hopelessly
insolvent railway as junk. New York Trust Co. v. Portsmouth & E. St. Ry.
(i9i, C. C. D. N. H.) 192 Fed. 728. If the road is sold as an entirety, the
purchaser takes it subject to a duty to continue operation. State ex rel. Brown v.
Beaton (i po) igo Iowa, 216, 178 N. W. i. Though there is no such duty if the
road can only be operated at a loss, unless it is created by an express contract with
the state to that effect. Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. R. R. Commiysion (i92o) 251
U. S. 396, 40 Sup. Ct. 183. It would seem in the instant case that a purchaser of
one of the small parcels would not intend to operate it as a railroad, and if he
did it seems obvious that it could not be run at a profit. Many courts avoid this
difficulty by decreeing execution and sale of a railroad only as a whole. See
Dayton, X. & B. R. R. v. Lewton (187o) 2o Ohio St. 4O, 413; Graham v.
Mt. Sterling Coalroad Co. (1878, Ky.) 14 Bush, 425. Unless it may be divided
into workable systems. Metropolitan Trtst Co. v. Chicago, & E. L R. R. (1918,
C. C. A. 7th) 253 Fed. 868. Although an interchange of facilities may be required
in interstate commerce. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, (24 Stat. at L. 38o) as amended by
Act of Feb. 28, 1920 (41 Stat. at L. 479). And in intrastate commerce by statute.
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. v. Iowa ([9]3) 233 U. S. 334, 34 Sup. Ct. 592. It
would seem that in the absence of statute, as in Illinois, joint use of equipment
could not be demanded of the several purchasers. It appears therefore that the
sale ordered in the instant case will result practically in a withdrawal from public
service of the railroad which will be prejudicial to the state. But however that
may be, the Attorney General might well have been permitted to intervene on the
additional ground that the sale ordered would be certain to involve the state in a
large amount of litigation if it attempted to force the purchasers to operate a
railroad.
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SALEs-DECLARATION OF VESSEL-ESTOPPEL BY SILENCE TO DENY VALIOIrY OF
REDECLARATIO1-The plaintiff contracted to ship sugar during August and Sep-
tember by steamer from Jaila, deliverable f.o.b. cars Philadelphia, "names of
such steamer or steamers to be declared later." The defendant requested the
plaintiff to delay shipment as long as possible, and the latter named the Washing-
ton Maru, which he thought would sail last. Later the plaintiff wrote naming
the Chifuku Maru which actually sailed after the Washington Maru, and the
defendant made no reply. The plaintiff sold to others the sugar on the latter
vessel, but when the Chifuku Maru arrived, the defendant refused to accept
delivery. The plaintiff thereupon sold to other parties, and sued for the differ-
ence between the contract price and the amount realized. The lower court denied
recovery, and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the defendant was estopped to
deny the validity of the redeclaration. Held, that the judgment be reversed.
Lamborn v. Win. M. Hardie Co. (1924, C. C. A. 6th) I Fed. (2d) 679.
A provision for declaring the name of the vessel shipped on has been held "to go
to the essence." Graves v. Legg (1854) 9 Exch. 7og. But if it is made solely for
the benefit of the' seller, the contrary rule obtains. J. Hungerford Smith Co.
v. Lamborn (1921, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) :oo N. Y. Supp. 292. There seem to
have been no decisions as to the effect of an unconditional declaration under a
contract such as that in the instant case. See (1924) 33 YALE LAW JouMNAL, 330.
The permissibility of a redeclaration would seem to depend upon whether or not
the buyer had acted reasonably in reliance on the first declaration. Thornton v.
Simpson (186, C. P.) 6 Taunt. 556; Bernardino Correa, Ltd. v. Porter & Co.
(1923, K B.) 16 Lloyd's List, i89. However, even should the first declaration
usually be conclusive, in the instant case are found all the elements which must
exist to raise an estoppel. Silence may be sufficient misleading conduct. Brown-
field v. Bookout (1921) 147 Ark. 555, 228 S. W. 51. And the seller sold the
cargo of the Washington Maru to others in reliance thereon to his detriment
Porter v. Goudzwaard (191o) 162 Mich. 158, 127 N. W. 295. The buyer's
requests for delay taken together with his silence upon receipt of the redeclara-
tion had the legal effect of imposing upon him the duty to accept the sugar
shipped on the Chifuku Maru.
SALEs-F. 0. B. CONTRACTS-RIGHT OF INsPEcTxoN.-The plaintiff, in Buffalo,
contracted to purchase of the defendant, a resident of Exmore, Va., six cars of
potatoes, f.o.b. cars, nothing being said as to time of payment. On the dates
specified for shipment, neither the plaintiff nor anyone representing him was at
Exmore and the defendant would not deliver until paid. The plaintiff sued for
damages for failure to deliver, claiming the right to inspect the potatoes on board
cars at Buffalo before payment. The defendant contended that delivery to the
carrier would constitute delivery to the buyer and that payment and delivery being
concurrent conditions, he was not in default because there was no tender of the
price. A verdict was directed for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. Held,
that the judgmeht be affirmed. Deveso v. Chandler (1924, 4th Dept.) 206 N. Y.
Supp. 6o4.
The Sales Act expressly recognizes that, under certain circumstances, business
men are accustomed to do business on a provisional payment basis. Sales Act,
secs. 47 (3), 69 (4) ; see Bills of Lading Act, sec. 41 (a). C. 0. D. and payment
against documents contracts are typical examples. And in such contracts, tender
of an opportunity to inspect is neither a duty on the seller nor a condition to his
right to payment. Brown v.'Raritan Chenical Works (1919, Ist Dept.) 188 App.
Div. 578, 177 N. Y. Supp. 309; Southwestern Milling Co. v. Niemeier (92) 76
Ind. App. 278, 131 N. E. 831; 2 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) see. 479; see Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Columbia Trust Co. (1924, N. Y., Sup. Ct. ist Dept.) 21o
App. Div. 705. This does not mean that the buyer must keep the goods if they
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do not conform; but he must pay first, provisionally, and then inspect. Wilson &
Co. v. M. Werk Co. '(I9i) 1o4 Ohio St. 507, 136 N. E. 202; Sales Act, sec. 69
(4) ; 2 Williston, op. cit. sec. 474. In face to face transactions,. inspection further
serves to protect the buyer from paying blindfolded. This is often intended where
the terms are sight draft against documents--"allow inspection," here assuming
that the shipment is in accordance with contract and that "title and risk pass" on
shipment. (1925) 34 YAaE LAw JoURNAL, 332. The question is, which function
inspection is to be construed as serving where the terms are f.o.b. point of ship-
ment. In such cases title usually passes on shipment according to contract.
D., L. & W. R. R. v. United States (1913) 231 U. S. 363, 34 Sup. Ct. 65;
Perkins v. Minford (1923) 235 N. Y. 301, 139 N. E. 276; i Williston, op. cit.
sec. 28o (b). By the bettir rule the risk of loss or deterioration in transit is on
the buyer even if there is express provision for opportunity to inspect on arrival.
Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co. (0922) 233 N. Y. 413, 135 N. E.
834; (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 332. Furthermore, the buyer may deal with
the goods by means of the bill of lading. In view of these facts it is not "mercan-
tilely reasonable,". in a contract of this kind, to hold tender of opportunity to inspect
a' condition precedent to right to payment and thus force the seller to bear the
credit strain while the goods are in transit or during the dispute which may arise.
Some courts accordingly hold that the buyer must inspect before shipment or pay
before inspection. Texas Mills Co. v. Moore (igio, W. D. Mo.) 177 Fed. 744;
Doggett v. Tatham (1911) i16 Md. 147, 81 AtI. 376; see E. Clemens Horst Co. v.
Biddell Bros. [i912] A. C. I8 adopting the excellent dissenting opinion of Kennedy,
L J. in [1g1] I K. B. 934, 952 (C. I. F. contract). Even the right of inspec-
tion before shipment is not absolute and must be demanded or it may be defeated
by shipment. Phoenix Iron Co. v. Wilkoff Co. (igi8, C. C. A. 6th) 253 Fed. 165.
The instant case, however, follows what is probably the prevailing rule in holding
the tender of an opportunity to inspect a condition precedent to payment of the
price. Erin v. Harris (189i) 87 Ga, 333, 13 S. E. 513; Charles V. Carter
(1896) 96 Tenn. 6o7, 36 S. W. 396. 'Courts unfortunately have a tendency to
overlook the distinction set forth above as to the two functions of an inspection
opportunity. While the decision in the instant case is clearly justified on the
grounds of custom, it is submitted that that should be the only ground for the
holding, and that contracts f.o.b. seller's city should be construed as coming
within the phrase "or otherwise," Sales Act, sec. 47 (3).
SAT.Es-LIABILITY OF WHOLESALER ON IhrLIED WARRANTY THAT FOOD IS
WHoLEsomE.-The defendants, wholesale grocers, sold to the plaintiff condensed
milk, manufactured by a third person. The milk was subsequently found unfit
for human consumption due to improper methods in its manufacture. The lower
court gave judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that the defendant, although
a wholesaler, impliedly warranted the goods to be wholesome. Held, that the
judgment be affirmed. I. Aron & Co. Inc. v. Sills (1924, App. Div. 1st
Dept.) 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 695.
The instant decision is a corollary to the rule that privity is necessary to an
action on a warranty. Chysky v. Drake (1923) 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576. It
furnishes a link in the chain of suits necessary to impose responsibility on the
manufacturer.
TORTs-LIABILTY FOR INvABING ANImALS-NEGLIGENCE A NECESsARY ELEMENT
WHERE ANIMALs ARE LAWFULLY ON THE PUBLIc HIGHwAY.-Defendant left his
pony and milk van unattended in the public highway. The pony bolted and dashed
through the window of plaintiff's shop adjoining the highway. Held, in the
absence of negligence there could be no recovery. Gayler & Pope, Ltd. v. Davies
& Son [1924] 2 K. B. 75.
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In 1482 Catesby, J. said that a drover of cattle along a highway might justify
their invasions of adjacent land against his will, for "the law will take notice
that a man can not always govern them as he would wish." Y. B. 22 Edw. IV, 8,
pl. 24. Later English cases seem to have put the defendant's justification on the
ground of the plaintiff's failure to fence. Harvy v. Gulson (16o3, C. B.) Noy,
io7; Dovaston v. Payne (1795, C. P.) 2 H. BI. 527; Goodwyn v. Cheveley
(I859, Exch.) 4 H. & N. 631; Tillett v. Ward (1882) L. R. io Q. B. Div. 17.
The instant case is the first English case to recognize the doctrine implicit in the
early case, supra, that persons owning land adjacent to a public highway hold it
subject to injuries resulting from the ordinary and reasonable user of the highway
by other persons. With this view the American cases are in substantial accord.
Brown v. Collins (1873) 53 N. H. 442; Wood v. Snider (907) 187 N. Y. 28, 79
N. E. 858; 12 L. R. A. (r. s.) 912, note.
TORTS-MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-RIGHT OF CORPORATION TO SuE.-The plaintiff
corporation brought suit to recover damages for malicious prosecution, alleging
that the credit and business of the corporation had been irreparably damaged and
that it had expended money for counsel fees for its defense. Claiming that a
corporation could not maintain an action for malicious prosecution, the defendant
moved for judgment on the pleadings. Held, that the motion be denied. New
England Tire & Sales Co. Inc. v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (1924, N. Y. Sup.
Ct. Spec. T.) 123 Misc. 954.
A corporation may maintain actions for defamation but only such as involve
damage to "property." The Knickerbocker Ins. Co, v. Eccleshe (1869, N. Y.
Super. C.) 42 How. Pr. 2oi (credit); Gross Coal Co. v. Rose (1905) 126 Wis.
24, 1O5 N. W. 225 (good will) ; Newell, Slander and Libel (3d ed. 1914) sec. 448.
And also, in the few cases which have arisen on the point, allegations of damage
to or interference with property have been held necessary to enable a corporation
to recover in an action for malicious prosecution. St. Johnsbury R. R. v. Hunt
(1882) 55 Vt. 570; Supreme Lodge of Baltimore v. Unverzagt (1892) 76 Md.
lO4, 24 Atl. 323; cf. Hansen Mercantile Co. v. Wyman, Partridge & Co. (igo8)
lO5 Minn. 491, 117 N. W. 9-6, 927.
UNINCORPORATED AssocIATIoNs-CrrIZENSHIP---JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL
CoURTs.-A citizenof Missouri sued in a federal court six labor unions organized
in, and confining their activities to, Illinois. The plaintiff claimed that the court
had jurisdiction because of diversity of citizenship, although some of the defen-
dants included as members citizens of Missouri. After several pleadings the defen-
dants demurred. Held, that the demurrers be sustained. Rusell -v. Central Labor
Union (1924, E. D. Ill.) I Fed. (2d) 412.
To estiblish jurisdiction of the federal courts on grounds of diversity of citizen-
ship it is necessary that there be diversity of citizenship between each plaintiff
and each defendant. U. S. Comp. Sts. 1916, see. 99I; Gage v. Carraher (i88o)
154 U3. S. 656, 14 Sup. Ct. 1190. Suits by and against corporations, however, are
excepted by a "conclusive presumption" that all their members are citizens of the
state of incorporation. Louisville Railroad v. Letson (I844, U. S.) 2 How. 497;
COMMENT (19o) 2 ILL. L. REv. 522. This fiction was early extended to unin-
corporated associations capable of being parties to actions. Maltz v. American
Exp. Co. (1876, E. D. Mich.) Fed. Cas. No. 9002. But the supreme court has
since held otherwise. Thonas v. Ohio State University Trustees (19o4) 195
U. S. 207, 25 Sup. Ct. 24; accord: Coyle v. Duncan Coal Co. (1923, E. D. Pa.)
288 Fed. 897; see Moon, Removal of Causes (19oi) sec. 128. The supreme
court appears to have decided that unincorporated labor unions may be parties to
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actions in the union name. Uiited Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. (1922)
259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570. In the instant case it appears to have been urge
that since it was established by the opinion in the Coronado case that labor unions
are "legal entities," all the doctrines applicable to corporations must apply to them,
including the fiction respecting citizenship in the state of organization. A contrary
position had already been established. Thonms v. Ohio State University Trustees,
supra. The instant decision is a warning that "legal entity" is merely a term
used by the courts to express a result already reached for given reasons which
need not serve as a premise for deciding new cases. See Sturges, Unincorporated
Associations as Parties to Actions (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOU.MAL, 383, 396.
Congestion of federal court dockets may well be a contributing reason for refusal
to extend the corporate fiction respecting citizenship to unincorporated associations.
It may be that the federal courts' refusal to exercise jurisdiction in such cases will
effect a substantial destruction of the procedural convenience afforded by the
Coronado case. See (1925) 25 CoL. L. REV. io4- However, the purpose of the
diversity of citizenship provision is not convenience of procedure, but rather an
avoidance of a "suspicion of partiality." Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. (1888)
127 U. S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370; 2 Story, Constitution (5th ed. i8gi) sec. 16go.
The instant decision places the plaintiff in no worse position than one suing any
other type of unincorporated association. Moreover, it is perhaps more desirable
to have such actions tried before local courts and juries who are familiar with
the programs of the community than before extra-local life tenure justices.
